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cided trend of courts to aid reaching a fugitive father by equitable
proceedings of contempt in a sister state to which he has fled, there
is no assurance that he can be reached or that the process will not
be lengthy and delayed. Now, between states which have enacted
this reciprocal law, the process is quick and sure and inexpensive.
The Act was first promulgated in 1950 by the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. All states which
have adopted the Law have done so since 1951. The speed with
which 34 jurisdictions44 have availed themselves of this reciprocal
legislation attests to the need existing for it. It would seem to be
desirable not only to the one dependent for support but to the com-
munity at large, for if support is not given and enforced as the
obligation exists, the dependent may become a public charge.
A rmine C. Ernst.
INSURANCE
PREMIUM PAYMENT UNDER INSTALLMENT PLAN
Arkansas. In Arkansas Inspection and Rating Bureau v. Insur-
ance Co. of North America' the Arkansas Insurance Commissioner
entered an order permitting the insurance company to use the In-
stallment Premium Endorsement Plan. This plan requires the in-
sured under a fire insurance policy to pay, in addition to the full
term premium, a charge to compensate the company for the cost of
deferring collection of the premium and for providing that the in-
surance coverage of the policy shall not be reduced by the payment
44Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana,
Kansas, Maine, *Maryland, *Massachusetts, Michigan, *Minnesota, Missouri, Mon-
tana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Virginia, *Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. (Asterisks indicate that the
Uniform Act has been adopted substantially or with modifications.)
1 -.... Ark_.- 238 S. W. 2d 929 (1951).
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of a loss. This order was contested on the ground that the plan was
a deviation from the custom of the prepaid term rule.
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the Commissioner's rul-
ing, however, saying that the Plan is not a deviation but merely a
variation from the custom of the prepaid term rule. The plan
merely allows the insured to do directly what he would otherwise
do indirectly by securing a loan to pay the premiums.
The court pointed out that there is no requirement of Arkansas
law which prevents the use of the Installment Premium Endorse-
ment Plan, and that installment plans are customary in virtually
every type of insurance other than fire insurance. Further, it was
pointed out, the evidence did not show that the rates involved were
either excessive or inadequate.
Although in fire insurance policies the premium payable becomes
a debt as soon as the risk attaches,' such a policy delivered on the
insured's promise to pay the premium in installments is valid,
where cash payment is not required in the policy.' Here the court's
decision seems reasonable since, although cash payment of a
premium may be customary, an insurance policy is effective upon
insured's promise to pay the premium in the future.4 Further, if it
is permissible for an insured to borrow from a bank to pay the
premiums, it does not seem to be any material deviation from the
custom of the prepaid term rule to allow the insurance company to
make the loan.
WAIVER OF PROVISION AGAINST ORAL WAIVERS
Arkansas. In Service Fire Ins. Co. v. Payne' the Universal C. I. T.
Credit Corporation financed a part of the purchase price of a truck
purchased by insured. C. I. T. required that the truck be insured by
defendant company, and both the financing and insurance coverage
were handled and controlled by defendant. Insured had nothing to
2 VANCE, INSURANCE (3d ed. 1951) § 50.
8 14 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE (1944) § 7955.
4 Id., § 8006.
5.------ Ark -----,236 S. W. 2d 1020 (1951).
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do with procuring the insurance on the truck. He paid all premiums
through defendant's agent and C. I. T. The fire insurance policy
provided that it did not apply while the automobile was subject to
any bailment lease, conditional sale, mortgage or other encum-
brance not specifically declared and described in the policy. It
further provided that notice to or knowledge of any agent should
not effect a waiver or estop the company from asserting any right
under the policy.
Shortly after the policy was issued, insured sold a one-half in-
terest in the truck, after consulting the manager of defendant com-
pany, who is turn discussed it with the manager of C. I . T.'s local
office. Neither party made any objection to the sale. A few months
later insured made a conditional sale of his remaining interest in
the truck, but at the time the fire loss had not been paid anything
on this one-half interest. When the truck was destroyed by fire,
the insurance company paid C. I. T. the balance due it but denied
liability because of breach of policy provisions.
The Arkansas Supreme Court held that although the policy pro-
vided that no waiver of terms would be effective except by endorse-
ment issued to form a part of this policy, such provision may be
waived orally. Any condition inserted in a policy for the benefit
of the insurer may be waived by it. The court also attached signifi-
cance to the fact that defendant treated the policy valid insofar as
C. I. T. was concerned.
The case follows the general rule that a stipulation against oral
waivers and requiring any waiver to be in writing and attached to
the policy is, like any other policy provision, itself subject to
waiver. Such stipulation is for the company's benefit and may be
waived by it.6 This rule was followed by the Texas Supreme Court
in Wagner v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co.7
6 16 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE (1944) § 9210.
7 92 Tex. 549, 50 S. W. 569 (1899).
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REQUIREMENT OF DELIVERY IN SOUND HEALTH
Oklahoma. In Farmers & Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Lemon8 a
policy was issued on defendant's life when he was two years old.
The policy contained a supplemental contract that in event of the
death of the purchaser, defendant's father, future premiums pay-
able on the policy would be waived. Within a year after the policy
was delivered, the purchaser died, and the insurance company
brought suit to cancel the waiver of premium provision. The com-
pany alleged that the applicant made false and fraudulent answers
and representation as to his health when he stated that he had no
ailment of the brain or nervous system or of the heart or lungs.
Allegation was made that the applicant had had a series of heart
attacks during the two years preceding his death.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court denied the relief sought saying
that if the applicant is going about his daily labor and has no rea-
son to believe, and in good faith does not believe, that he is afflicted
with any serious malady, and he has no reason to know and does not
know of any serious impairment to his health, then he is justified in
representing himself to be in good health. In such case he is not
guilty of fraudulent or wilfully false representation, even if it were
then true that he was actually afflicted with a serious malady. In
the court's view the evidence did not sustain the company's charge
of false representations in the application for the insurance.
The policy contained a condition that the company was not liable
unless the policy was delivered while both the insured and the pur-
chaser were in good health and while their health was as described
in the application. However, the court held that the plaintiff did
not rely upon this provision at all, but elected to base its action on
fraud and wilful misrepresentation.
In the majority of states if a serious disease is present and the
insured is not in sound health, regardless of his belief, the insurer
is not liable under "delivery in sound health clause." Sound health
is a condition precedent to the existence of a valid policy contract. 9
8 --- Okla._ 228 P. 2d 634 (1951).
9 1 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE (1941) 1 154.
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But the Oklahoma courts have held to the contrary and have said
that the "sound health" clause is not violated by latent defects
which are unknown to the applicant.1" This rule adopted by Okla-
homa may help to explain the holding against the insurance com-
pany in the instant case.
COLLISION WITH FLOOD WATERS
Texas. In Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. Profitt" the in-
sured's automobile was driven onto a causeway across a river which
normally flowed over the causeway at a depth of six or seven inches.
But since the river was in a stage of flood, the water was deeper on
this occasion, and the car hit it with a "splash" and came to a halt
with the right wheels off the causeway. The driver was unable to
extricate the car, and it was washed from the causeway and dam-
aged beyond repair. Defendant insurance company admitted that
the events constituted a collision and upset within the meaning of
the collision policy. But it was contended that a new and independ-
ent cause - the floodwaters - interrupted the causal connection
between the collision and the loss of the car and itself became the
proximate cause of the loss.
The Texas Supreme Court ruled that even though the automobile
had come to rest after its original collision with the water, only to
be washed away thereafter, the insurance company was still liable
under the terms of the policy. The court said that the force of the
floodwaters against the automobile was a collision within the mean-
ing of the collision coverage and that the collision was the proximate
cause of the damage. Water in motion collides with that with which
it comes in contact, and the collision of the water with the automo-
bile set in motion the unbroken series of events which led to the
destruction of the automobile.
The comprehensive insurance clause in the policy provided that
10 National Aid Life Assn. v. Persing, 178 Okla. 522, 63 P. 2d 35 (1936) ; United
Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Knapp, 175 Okla. 25, 51 P. 2d 963 (1935).
21 -------- Tex ------ 239 S. W. 2d 379 (1951).
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loss caused by windstorm, bail, water, flood, etc., should not be
deemed loss caused by collision or upset. The court interpreted
this as enlarging the coverage under the comprehensive clause and
not as limiting the coverage under the collision clause. It was
pointed out that if the insurance company had intended to limit
its liability under the collision clause, it should have repeated the
words used in the comprehensive clause so that loss caused by flood
could not be deemed loss caused by collision or upset.
This same court in another 1951 case said it was proper to con-
sider all of the coverages in determining the rights and obligations
of the parties. 2 But there both clauses were identical, covering
damage resulting from certain listed causes such as windstorm,
hail and earthquakes with the exception that one included the
phrase "flood or rising waters." So it was obvious that the two
clauses were intended to be selected in the alternative by the in-
sured, whereas in the instant case the coverages were mutually
exclusive.
In finding that the events involved here constituted a collision
the court followed what appears to be the modern trend of
authority. 8
DOUBLE INDEMNITY PROVISION COVERING ACCIDENTS IN
CONNECTION WITH PASSENGER VEHICLES OF THE
PLEASURE TYPE
Texas. In Pennell v. United Ins. Co." a health and accident
policy provided for double indemnity payments in the event of
insured's injury "while driving or riding within any private pas-
senger automobile exclusively of the pleasure type." The supreme
court said that these words were unambiguous and that the double
12 Glen Falls Ins. Co. v. McCown, ----- Tex._. ,236 S. W. 2d 108.
13 Harris v. American Casualty Co., 83 N. J. L. 641, 85 At]. 194 (1912) ; Ringo v.
Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford, 143 Ore. 420, 22 P. 2d 887 (1933) ; Long v. Royal
Insurance Co., 180 Wash., 360, 40 P. 2d 132 (1935); 5 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND
PRACTICE (1941) § 3205.
14 --- Tex._ 243 S. W. 2d 572 (1951).
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indemnity provision did not apply to automobiles that are con-
structed and intended to be used for carrying freight or for agri-
cultural or industrial purposes, even though also intended to be
used for pleasure. Consequently, the court ruled that the insured
could recover only single indemnity for injuries sustained while
riding in a Willys jeep, which was described as an all-purpose car
intended for hard service rather than pleasure.
In Union Pacific R. Co. v. United States 5 it was held that the
wartime jeep was primarily a passenger car and was correctly so
classified for freight rate purposes. But the Texas Supreme Court
did not accept that decision as authority that the jeep is a passen-
ger automobile exclusively of the pleasure type. Its opinion was
based on the apparent purpose for which the type of car was built
rather than on the purpose for which the particular vehicle was
used.
It seems that because of the wide variety of body styles pro-
duced by manufacturers of automobiles the criterion adopted by
the Texas court may lead to a great deal of confusion. How would
the majority of the court apply the rule to station wagons or auto-
mobiles with a back seat that folds forward to provide more carry-
ing capacity? It appears that when used by large families purely
for transportation or by vacationers and sportsmen to carry lug-
gage and sporting equipment they are automobiles exclusively of
the pleasure type. But if the same car is used for agricultural or
industrial purposes, the opposite is true. Apparently, under the
ruling of the court only single indemnity may be recovered for
an injury suffered while riding in a jeep used exclusively as a
family car, while double indemnity could be recovered for an in-
jury received in an ordinary passenger car which is supplied by a
company to its agent. Which one is exclusively of the pleasure
type?
The preferable view seems to be that taken by the dissenting
justices, who accepted the jury's finding that this jeep, which was
15 117 Ct. C1. 534. 91 F. Supp. 762 (1950).
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used as a family car and to deliver rural mail, was an automobile
exclusively of the pleasure type. They said that the policy should
be construed and applied in the light of the facts of the case and
that ambiguous terms in a policy are to be construed in the in-
sured's favor. This latter principle has been adopted by a majority
of the courts even as to double indemnity features of accident
policies which, it is sometimes thought, should not be construed
so strictly against the insurer as in the case of the single indemnity
feature. 6
In the instant case, although the insurer was held not liable for
double indemnity payments, it could not set off double indemnity
payments, made under a mistake of law and before it contested
liability, against single indemnity payments that were still due.
The court held that money voluntarily paid on a claim of right,
with full knowledge of all the facts, in the absence of fraud, duress,
or compulsion, cannot be recovered merely because the payor was
ignorant of or mistook the law as to his liability. This part of the
court's decision is in accord with the general rule.'
GROUP INSURANCE
Texas. In Board of Ins. Com'rs. v. Great Southern Life Ins. Co.'8
the Bankers Association entered into an agreement with a Trustee
whereby each participating bank would contribute money from its
own funds or from funds jointly provided by it and its participat-
ing employees, with which the Trustee was directed to purchase
life insurance for each participating employee and to pay the
premiums thereon. Title to every such policy was vested in the
Trustee, who was given broad powers to exercise most of the rights,
options or privileges of the owners. The Insurance Company
agreed to, accept, without selection, those employees eligible, pro.
vided that none was selected who was over 60 years and 6 months
16 VANCE, INSURANCE (3d ed. 1951) 962.
17 See authorities collected in 40 AM. JUR., Payment, § 205.
is .----- Tex.... 239 S. W. 2d 803 (1951).
[Vol. 6
1952] SURVEY OF SOUTHWESTERN LAW FOR 1951 335
of age. It was also stipulated that there must be at least 500 appli-
cants or at least $1,000,000 of insurance before the plan would
become effective. A separate policy was issued for each applicant
and delivered to the Trustee, and a certificate of beneficial interest
was delivered to the employee.
The Board of Insurance Commissioners declared that those poli-
cies which were issued to employees of banks having less than 25
employees were issued in violation of the statute controlling group
insurance. The Insurance Company, however, said that this was
not group insurance, since a policy was issued to each employee,
whereas the statute contemplated a single policy for the entire
group.
The Texas Supreme Court upheld the Board's ruling, saying
that in the series of instruments which comprised the entire con-
tract could be found most of the indicia characteristic of group
insurance. The policies insured the lives of the employees for the
benefit of persons other than the employer; all employees under
60 years and 6 months were eligible; the premiums were paid
either wholly by the employer, in which case all employees were
required to participate, or jointly by the employer and the em-
ployees, in which case 80 per cent of the employees were required
to participate (the group insurance statute requires 75 per cent
membership in such instance); the employees were precluded from
paying the entire premium; and the amount of each policy was
determined by a plan which precluded individual selection by the
employees. Further, looking to the intent of the parties, the court
said that it was obvious that the Insurance Company would not
have issued, without evidence of insurability, ordinary life insur-
ance policies if it had not been assured of a spread of risks among
a group.
The supreme court also said that the statute prohibiting the
writing of group insurance covering a group of less than 25
persons was not unconstitutional, since it was a reasonable exercise
of the legislature's power to regulate the writing of life insurance.
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The decision seems to be correct since it appears clear that the
parties to the transaction contemplated a group insurance plan,
and a reading of the instruments involved substantiates this
conclusion.
USE OF CRIMINAL COURT DECISION TO INTERPRET PROVISION
OF THEFT POLICY
Texas. In Bomar v. Insurance Indemnity & Ins. Co. 9 a pur-
ported purchaser of insured's car induced the belief that a check
given for the purchase price would be paid when the title cleared
with the State Highway Department. He thus obtained possession
of the automobile and a certificate of title and appropriated the
property to his own use and benefit. Insured carried with defend-
ant a comprehensive policy of insurance, including the "broad
form" of theft coverage, insuring against loss by theft except "loss
due to conversion, embezzlement or secretion by any person in
lawful possession of the automobile under a bailment lease, condi-
tional sale, mortgage or other encumbrance."
The supreme court overruled the lower court and held for the
insured. The court said that under the decisions of the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals the purchaser's actions amounted to theft,
inasmuch as the distinction between the crimes of swindling and
theft is no longer recognized. The court cited De Blanc v. State"0
as refusing to follow the doctrine that the passing of title as well
as possession is the difference between swindling and theft. Since
the offender obtained title and possession of the automobile by a
fraudulent scheme, he was guilty of the crime of theft as known
to the laws of Texas. Consequently, the exceptions enumerated in
the policy did not apply, and the insured was allowed to recover.
It appears that the Texas Supreme Court does not agree with the
reasoning of Judge Cardozo when he said that the statutes of a
state defining larceny, embezzlement, etc., do not govern but that
19 ------Tex.. -, 242 S. W. 2d 160 (1951).
20 118 Tex. Crim. Rep. 628, 37 S. W. 2d 1024 (1931).
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